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Abstract 
In the last few years high and unstable food and agricultural commodity prices and concerns about 
population growth, increasing per capita food demands and environmental constraints have pushed 
agriculture and food production up national and international political, policy and research agendas. 
Drawing on both theory and empirical evidence, this paper argues that fundamental impacts of 
agricultural productivity and food price changes on development and poverty reduction are often 
overlooked in current debates. This is exacerbated by a lack of relevant and accessible indicators for 
monitoring agricultural productivity and real food prices. Two relatively simple and widely applicable 
sets of indicators are proposed for policy use in monitoring agricultural productivity and food price 
changes. Historical series of these indices are estimated for selected countries, regions and the world, 
and their strengths, weaknesses and potential value are discussed in the context of the need for 
better sustainable agricultural development and food security indicators in any post 2015 successors 
to the current MDGs. 
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Agricultural productivity and food prices: 
fundamental development impacts and indicators 
 
Andrew Dorward, 
 
1. Introduction 
Recent years have seen increasing average food prices, severe food price shocks (in 2008 and 
2010/11), and increasing concerns about the impacts of food prices shocks, high food prices and 
food price volatility on poor and food insecure people.  This paper reviews historical changes in 
staple food prices (in terms of international grain prices) and then uses basic microeconomic 
development theory to consider agricultural productivity and food price impacts on and roles in 
development and poverty reduction. This provides a foundation for subsequent design of indicators 
for monitoring agricultural productivity change and food price changes relative to the real incomes 
of poor people.  Historical series of two sets of indicators are estimated for selected countries, 
regions and the world, and their strengths, weaknesses and potential value discussed. The paper 
concludes with a discussion of the challenges posed by this analysis in the context of growing threats 
to global food availability and the relevance of the proposed indicators to debates on new 
international development goals to follow the Millennium Development Goals after 2015.  
2. Long term changes in staple food prices 
(Dorward, 2012b) shows that changes in staple food prices reflect changes in the opportunity cost of 
food consumption and production in terms of real income and substitution effects for consumers 
and cost, substitution and income effects for producers. Monetary food prices should therefore be 
compared with other price series when looking at price changes: staple food prices should be 
deflated by consumer price indices and income comparators when examining food price changes for 
consumers, and deflated by other agricultural product prices and by input prices when examining 
food price changes for producers, as shown in figure 1 1.  
     
                                                          
1
 International grain prices are summarised using the World Bank Development Prospects Group ‘cereals’ price 
index.  This hides considerable diversity in shorter term price fluctuations between maize, wheat and rice, 
but shows well the broad patterns which are common to all the main grains. 
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Figure 1 Indexed grain prices 1960-2011 (2005 = 100) 
Sources: (World Bank, 2012), (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2012) 
 
For measures of price changes more relevant to grain producers’ decisions (though not necessarily 
to their relative incomes), Figure 1(c) shows international grain prices deflated by the prices of other 
agricultural commodities that farmers might produce (although this does not allow for the effects of 
tariffs, subsidies and technical change on different commodities’ relative profitability). This analysis 
shows no clear secular change in grain prices relative to other agricultural commodities.  Figure 1(d), 
however, shows a dramatic fall in the price of grains relative to energy during and following the 
1970s oil crisis and from 2002. A similar pattern, but considerably dampened, is observed for the 
price of grains prices relative to fertilisers. It should be noted that the larger scale in figure 1(d) may 
appear to suggest that from 1980 grain prices have fallen much less relative to fertiliser prices than 
to GDP per capita or US CPI (in figures 1(a) and (b). This is only partly true: grain prices relative to 
fertilisers also follow a different pattern.  
In summary then, nominal grain prices have risen dramatically since the 1960s, but in real terms  
• they have fallen substantially relative to the prices of other goods and services consumed by 
richer people 
• they have fallen substantially relative to the incomes of rich people 
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• there are no readily available indicators of changes more relevant to poor consumers, but 
price falls are less than for rich consumers (see below and (Dorward, 2011)) 
• there are no clear changes against prices of other agricultural commodities 
• they have fallen dramatically against oil prices and less dramatically against the prices of 
fertilisers 
These observations raise two questions: why do we observe these patterns, and what is their 
significance for understanding the long term developmental impacts of food price changes?  
3. Longer term impacts of changes in food prices 
We structure discussion of the two questions about the causes and effects of long term patterns of 
food price change by considering three factors affecting and affected by long term food price 
changes: area expansion, technical and institutional change, and structural change.  
3.1. Area expansion 
A major long run change affecting food prices has been the historical expansion of the area planted 
to food crops. Table 1 shows how figures for areas under cereals and arable production have 
changed since 1961 and 2000.  Although the accuracy and reliability of some of these figures may be 
questioned (for example there is a sudden large jump in reported areas under cereals in upper 
middle income countries in 1992), there appears to be a consistent longer term and more recent 
pattern of change increasing area under cereals and wider arable production in lower income 
countries (with increases in cereal areas in low income countries partly at the expense of other 
crops’ share of land ) and a slowly declining  area under cereals and wider arable production in 
higher income countries.  Rates of growth (decline) are lower (higher) for low (high) income 
countries in the period from 2000 (although this may not pick up responses to higher 2008 prices). 
However continued expansion of cultivated areas is problematic in most parts of the world due to 
(a) environmental and sustainability problems with cultivation in marginal and forested land and (b) 
shortages of other fertile and well watered land (for example (Hazell and Wood, 2008), (Foresight, 
2011)), although there is potential for substantial expansion of cultivated areas in parts of sub 
Saharan Africa (for example (Binswanger-Mkhize and Morris, 2009)), despite substantial challenges  
(Binswanger-Mkhize and Morris, 2009; Hazell and Wood, 2008).  
Table   1. Changes in yields and areas from 1961 and 2000  
Period High income 
(OECD) 
Upper middle 
income 
Lower middle 
income 
Low 
income World 
Cereal land 1961-2009 
-0.08% 0.77% 0.79% 1.63% 0.65% 
Arable land 1961-2008 
-0.09% 1.77% 0.65% 0.95% 0.60% 
Cereal land 2000-2009 
-0.28% 0.49% 0.53% 2.43% 0.55% 
Arable land 2000-2008 
-0.46% -0.12% 0.25% 1.22% -0.02% 
Cereal yield 1961-2009 1.90% 2.30% 2.04% 0.96% 1.85% 2000-2009 1.43% 1.73% 1.60% 1.18% 1.38% 
Source: Author calculations from (World Bank, 2011) 
3.2. Technical and institutional change 
The major long run change affecting food prices considered in neo-classical economic theory is 
technical change, the change in production function
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technology. This is a major driver of global increases in cereals yields and, with increases in 
cultivated areas discussed above, of historical production increases.  Technical change may be 
embodied in new forms of physical and natural capital (for example machinery and seeds). Another 
form of very long run change is the development  of new institutions – rules and structures 
governing social, political and economic interactions (North, 1990). Theories of induced technical 
and institutional change relate technology, institutions, resource endowments and culture together, 
with changes in each driving interactive change in others (Ruttan and Hayami, 1984).  
This analysis suggests that high food prices raise the incentives for governments and private 
companies to invest more in agricultural research, to develop such technologies, and implement 
policies and services that will promote the adoption of such technologies.  It is widely argued that 
low food prices (relative to other commodities) caused many governments and the international 
community to reduce their investment in agricultural research, and this is cited by some authors as 
one of the causes of the slow-down in agricultural productivity growth from the mid 1990s (for 
example (Piesse and Thirtle, 2009)). (Timmer, 2010) argues that there is a roughly thirty year cycle of 
world food crises, as falling food prices depress government and private investment in agricultural 
research, until the rate of growth in demand overtakes supply, triggering a crisis, which kick starts 
renewed investment in research until prices fall again: far sighted governments should therefore 
invest more consistently to prevent food crises in the future. However global trade means that low 
food prices are a global public good2  and hence investment in agricultural research should be 
globally coordinated3. This recognises that governments have an interest in preventing food price 
crises. However this interest arises not just from the consideration of the negative ‘short and 
medium term’ impacts discussed by (Dorward, 2012b):  there is a much more fundamental, long 
term reason for governments concerned about their citizens welfare to seek long term falls in food 
prices: in order to promote structural change and economic growth.   
 
3.3. Structural change 
Governments and other agencies seeking to promote poverty reduction and economic growth and 
development should have a particular interest in lowering food prices relative to income as these are 
an important determinant of wider economic growth. This is illustrated in figure 2, which shows how 
agricultural labour productivity plays a foundational role within wider economic development 
processes.  
 
 
                                                          
2
 In the long run low food prices are non-excludable and non-rival benefits from government investment in 
agricultural research, and they also arise as an externality from commercial research investments in excludable 
technologies. In the short term they arise as externalities from producers’ and traders’ decisions to produce 
and sell food. 
3
 Potential limits on continued expansion of high external input and energy dependent technologies from 
global environmental problems associated with them are discussed later, but reductions in these ‘public bads’ 
are another form of global public good from investments in agricultural technology development.  
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Figure 2 Food, energy and development processes and challenges 
 
Following a long standing literature on the role of agricultural development in wider development 
processes (for example (Johnston and Mellor, 1961; Mellor, 1995; Timmer, 1988)) and in line with 
more recent empirical work (Christiaensen et al., 2011), the top left corner of figure 2 shows how 
agricultural revolutions that raise agricultural labour productivity in poor agrarian economies can 
play multiple foundational roles in wider development processes, as increased production per 
worker leads to increasing food availability per worker. This then (a) lowers the cost (and hence 
price) of food relative to agricultural worker incomes, (b) this raises agricultural workers’ budget 
surpluses after food expenditures and hence increases their real incomes, (c) this stimulates demand 
for non-food goods and services and (d) simultaneously releases agricultural labour from food 
production to production of other goods and services (as fewer workers are needed to produce the 
food that society requires).  Agricultural labour productivity growth in poor agrarian economies thus 
simultaneously raises productivity of poor countries’ and poor people’s abundant and critical 
resource (agricultural labour), raises their real incomes, and stimulates both supply and demand of 
non-food goods and services (in the centre of the figure). This simultaneous creation of supply and 
demand is critical to but often lacking in changes stimulated by development interventions.  
The figure also shows, starting from the lower right corner, how industrial, service and knowledge 
revolutions have built on the basic, initial increase in supply and demand for non-food goods and 
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services to lower the labour costs of their production. In this these revolutions are performing the 
same function as the earlier agricultural revolution. However agriculture’s relative importance, and 
the potential benefits from increased agricultural labour productivity then fall, as food production’s 
shares of labour use and expenditure fall. This is matched by increasing importance of industrial, 
service and knowledge revolutions in raising the productivity of increasing amounts of labour 
involved in the production of non-food goods and services, which are responsible for an increasing 
share of consumer expenditures.  
A number of points should be noted about this analysis. 
• First, falling food prices relative to incomes are an essential part of this process and have 
been a characteristic of all wealthy and developed economies, and indeed of all wealthy 
groups within rich and poor societies (see figure 1(b)).  This may be considered an ‘economic 
truth’ that arises from a fundamental ‘accounting identity’ (Schelling, 1995)4 
• Second, broad based increases in the productivity of labour applied to staple food 
production on small farms offer an important but challenging and transitional means of 
widespread, pro-poor growth in poor agrarian economies5. They lead to increases in 
productivity and in returns to large amounts of relatively unproductive resources (land and 
labour) that are important in both the national economy and in the livelihoods of poor 
people. As noted earlier, labour productivity changes simultaneously stimulate (a) a push of 
labour into the supply of non-food goods and services and (b) an increase in income 
available for the purchase of these goods and services, which later pulls labour out of 
agriculture. Increases in capital intensive productivity outside the smallholder sector (e.g. in 
large scale mechanised commercial agriculture or mining) do not deliver these coordinated 
stimuli in poor agrarian economies. Of course policy may seek to reproduce this, using taxes 
and subsidies to transfer income from owners of capital and smaller numbers of skilled 
workers to poor rural people (as for example with social protection policies in Brazil). 
However this presents significant political economy and governance challenges and requires 
a large, highly productive and rapidly growing large scale capital intensive sector that can 
support these very large transfers. It also misses an important potential growth opportunity 
by not simultaneously raising the productivity of poor people’s labour – unless rural labour 
can be quickly absorbed into rapidly growing labour intensive manufacturing. Consideration 
of the relative merits of large scale and small sale agricultural  development must therefore 
take these issues into consideration as well as differences in productivity, productivity 
growth and size between the large and small scale agriculture sectors6. Such approaches 
may be appropriate in emerging and middle income economies, but despite difficulties with 
smallholder development are unlikely to provide efficient and rapid routes to poverty 
reduction and broad based growth in many poor agrarian economies.7  
                                                          
4
 I am indebted to Dirk Bezemer for drawing this to my attention.  
5
 The importance of ‘labour demanding technical change’ has long been recognised in agricultural economics 
literature – for example (Lipton and Longhurst, 1989). 
6
 (Christiaensen et al., 2011) provide a useful empirical examination of these issues.  
7
 The arguments in this paragraph are also relevant to explanations of how some small trading countries (such 
as Singapore and Hong Kong) and some oil rich countries have achieved rapid growth without developing 
their own agricultural sectors: these countries have normally started with very small poor rural populations 
and have relied on agricultural development in other countries for low price food imports.  
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• Third, there are major challenges in achieving welfare and developmental benefits from low 
food prices without undermining incentives for farmers to invest in new technologies and 
increased production.  The ‘food price tightrope’ needed to tread this path is particularly 
difficult in the early stages of growth in poor agrarian economies, and governments have 
used a variety of output, input, and technology and investment support policies to promote 
increased food crop production and productivity without ‘high’ prices. Some of these 
policies have been remarkably successful, while others have been disastrous failures (for 
example (Dorward et al., 2004)). 
• Fourth, both the agricultural and  the industrial, service and knowledge revolutions have 
been  based on fossil fuels replacing bioenergy (and hence solar energy) sources for tillage 
and nitrogen fixation, on increased use of material inputs,  on new technologies (often 
associated with fossil fuel and material inputs), on new knowledge, and on accumulation 
and investment of private and public capital (in varying mixes of technology and equipment; 
knowledge; fossil fuel extraction and use; transport and communications systems; and 
institutions).  However there is growing evidence and concern about environmental limits on 
continued high dependence on fossil fuels and materials,  about rising prices of energy and 
material inputs,  and  about increasing competition between food and energy production 
(for example (Foley et al., 2011; Foresight, 2011; Godfray et al., 2010a; Naylor, 2011)). 
Furthermore, while various positive feedbacks have supported development processes in 
the past (for example capital accumulation; economies of scope in technology development 
and knowledge generation and application; improved health and human capital; and 
positive aspects of globalisation) some of these may be reaching their limits while negative 
feedbacks are growing in importance. These include limits to natural resource availability 
(for example water and land), loss of natural resources due to over-exploitation and 
degradation, reduced productivity due to waste and pollution (climate change perhaps the 
most serious and egregious example), associated biodiversity loss, health problems 
(increasing incidence of obesity and related diseases alongside continued undernutrition - 
((McLellan, 2002; Prentice, 2006)), and negative impacts of globalisation and inequity.  
• Fifth, and drawing together previous points, limits and threats to increased labour 
productivity in food production are threats not only to the ability of the world to feed its 
growing population and to provide that population with high levels of material consumption 
and prosperity, but to the fundamental  ‘economic truth’ or accounting identity on which 
development is based. This raises serious questions about alternative less material visions of 
prosperity based, for example, on greater sharing of services and less material consumption 
(for example (Jackson, 2009)) and about the extent to which non-industrial forms of 
agricultural (such as agroforestry or  agro-ecological, conservation or organic farming) can 
support developed societies if they require higher labour input per unit output to maintain 
or raise per hectare yields8. These issues raise fundamental and important questions not 
only about global food and agricultural systems and the prospects of poor agrarian 
                                                          
8
 Such approaches are often criticised for having high labour requirements, but this is by no means universal  
(for example herbicide use in conservation farming reduces weeding labour requirements), but while 
information on yields and labour use per hectare are commonly discussed, this is not the case for labour 
productivity (for example (de Schutter, 2011) while the IAASTD Synthesis report ((IAASTD, 2009)) frequently 
mentions agricultural, farm, crop, animal, water, energy, input and land productivity and efficiency, but there 
is no reference to labour productivity, apart from an indirect mention of ill health effects on productivity).  
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economies: these issues are fundamentally important to aspirations about standards and 
modes of living in developed economies too, and about structures of society and economic 
activity (for example (Lang, 2010; Van Der Ploeg, 2010; Weis, 2010)).   
This analysis, along with the widely documented equitability and efficiency of smallholder farming in 
many poor rural economies (for example (Hazell et al., 2010)), highlights the importance of 
smallholder farming in addressing both global and local agricultural and food system challenges9. 
More fundamentally, it shows that long run technical and structural change underpin economic 
development and ‘developed’ societies: food prices, agricultural worker productivity, and global 
threats to supply / demand balances  are fundamental long term development issues. In addition to 
their critical importance for food security, health and physical and mental development for poorer 
children and adults, they affect the global economy and the welfare of rich as well as poor 
economies, nations and people. As global public goods, research and policy for high rural labour 
productivity in sustainable and resilient agricultural and food systems need much greater attention 
in international policy than they have had in the past -  they should for example be a core part of any 
successor to the Millennium Development Goals after 2015 (Waage et al., 2010). Their inclusion in 
such a scheme, however, needs coordination around policy goals and targets, and targets need 
indicators. In the following sections we therefore consider possible indicators for use in national and 
international policy.  We consider first indicators of agricultural productivity change and then of food 
price changes.  
Before moving on, however, it is important to note that similar arguments may be made about 
energy costs and prices as about food costs and prices: low energy costs and prices are also 
fundamental to modern economies and standards and modes of living (depending to some extent 
on climates). This exacerbates the agricultural labour productivity and food price threats to 
prosperity and development discussed here – unless low cost renewable energy sources and 
systems can be rapidly developed and deployed. 
4. Developing indicators of agricultural productivity change 
We now consider possible indicators for use in national and international policy concerned with 
promoting agricultural productivity that supports the fundamental development processes and 
addresses the threats identified in the previous section. This is an issue that is of particular 
importance given growing debate about what could and should follow the current MDGs after 2015. 
We first identify the desirable features that such indicators should have if they are to be useful in 
supporting national and international target setting and monitoring. Experience with the MDGs is 
useful here (see (Waage et al., 2010)).  We identify 4 broad criteria 
1. Indicators must first be relevant to policy goals and targets, demanding not only that they 
should have a sound theoretical basis and discourage ‘goal displacement’ difficulties, they 
should also be intuitively meaningful and appealing to policy makers and the wider public 
and promote ‘joined up’ and holistic thinking within and across sectors.    
                                                          
9
 Poulton (pers. comm.) notes that under this analysis if a small country achieves agricultural growth when 
there are high prices in world markets then this will delay the transition out of agriculture, possibly leading to a 
delayed industrialisation. While this depends upon success in solving the food price tightrope problem and in 
promoting labour demanding technical change, it could present opportunities for smallholders in Africa given 
expected continuation of higher global food prices.  
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2. Indicators should also be consistently applicable over time and across different countries 
and different circumstances in order to allow comparison across countries and regions and 
analysis of change within countries and regions.  
3. Timely and sufficiently comprehensive and reliable and accurate data for these indicators 
should be either available or potentially available (ideally the former),  at reasonable cost for 
national, regional  and global calculations 
4. Ideally such data should already be available for historical analysis and comparisons.  
Earlier sections of this paper have established that staple food prices and agricultural labour force 
productivity10 are critical for people’s welfare and long term economic growth and structural change. 
Value added in the agricultural sector divided by size of the agricultural labour force should then be 
an appropriate measure of agricultural productivity.  Difficulties in choice of price measures to 
account for changing prices across different agricultural commodities can be addressed by 
measuring value added in terms of cereal equivalents, by dividing value added by the price of 
cereals. This sidesteps the pricing problem (provided that equivalent measures are used for current 
prices of cereals and in value added measures) and simultaneously recognises the fundamental 
importance of staple food prices relative to all economies, rich and poor, as well as to poor people.  
We propose, therefore, as a core indicator of agricultural development and its wider contribution to 
the economies of which it is a part, an indicator we term the Cereal Equivalent Productivity of 
Agricultural Labour (or CEPAL) where  
CEPAL=
Agricultural Value Added
Agricultural Workers	*	Cereal Prices
 
 
Operationalisation of this indicator requires definition and sourcing of each of the variables. This is 
not, in principle, a difficulty for ‘Agriculture Value Added’ or for ‘Agricultural Workers’, for which 
data are routinely available at country level in the World Bank’s World Development Indicators 
(World Bank, 2011) 11. There are more difficulties with cereal prices. Questions arise about the 
relative desirability and availability of international prices and of domestic prices, about the 
weighting of different cereals in aggregate prices, and for some countries about the inclusion of non-
cereal staples. An argument can be made for using international prices if these differ from domestic 
prices as a result of government interventions, as under these circumstances international prices 
may be a better measure of true efficiency prices. However this will not be the case if prices differ as 
a result of natural barriers to trade. In either case weighting of different cereals’ prices should take 
account of their relative importance in local consumption, and ideally one would move from prices 
of staples to prices per kcal from all staples, including root crops, weighted by their calorific share in 
food consumption. There are, however, practical difficulties in obtaining data on local prices and 
consumption shares. FAOSTAT has domestic producer prices from 1991, but data series are not 
                                                          
10
 It should be noted here that productivity per hour worked is not critical for the processes of structural 
change and development discussed earlier, but the average productivity of all labour in the agricultural 
sector, whether fully, or partially employed, or indeed unemployed.  
11
 The WDI provides ‘Agriculture Value Added’ and ‘Agricultural Value Added per Worker at constant 2000 
US$’, from which Agricultural Workers can be calculated. FAOSTAT also provides data on ‘Total economically 
active population in Agriculture’. The two sources have very similar data, though the WDI data appears to 
have fewer inconsistencies. Data quality is an issue, which we discuss later. 
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complete and appear to contain some discrepancies. No readily available and comprehensive source 
was identified with yearly data by country on staple consumption shares (FAOSTAT has information 
on production shares, but this will not be appropriate for countries with large grain imports or 
exports).  
To provide some test of the indicator, data series for CEPAL were constructed first using 
international grain prices from the World Bank (World Bank, 2012) and then (for countries but not 
regions) using domestic producer prices from FAOSTAT, weighted by production shares (FAO, 2011).   
Indicators may be presented using absolute estimates (in kg of cereal equivalent per worker) or 
indexed, the former allowing comparison between countries and regions and the latter allowing 
analysis of changes in productivity within and across countries and regions.  
 
 
Figure 3 CEPAL (tonnes grain equivalent / worker) by country income group 
For (a) OECD high income group is scaled on the left hand axis, other income groups on the right  
Source: calculated using World Bank international grain prices and weights 
Figure 3 shows estimates of CEPAL by country income group, first with raw values and then indexed. 
There are striking differences between raw values of labour productivity  between the high income 
group and other groups (requiring raw data for high income countries to be scaled separately on the 
left hand axis in figure 3(a)).Cereal equivalent labour productivity rises steadily from low to high 
income groups, and has generally risen from 1980 to 2010, except for low income countries - but the 
extent of the rise varies between income groups and falls during periods of high cereal prices12.   A 
fall in CEPAL from 2004 in high income countries (also reflected in the global CEPAL estimate) may be 
explained by changes in agricultural support policies in OECD countries (Poulton, pers. comm.).  
Figures A1 to A3, in Annex A, show estimates of CEPAL and indexed CEPAL for selected countries in 
Asia, Sub Saharan Africa and Latin America, and also compare estimates using international grain 
                                                          
12
 Although grain prices rises lead to a fall in productivity measured by CEPAL (due to a fall in the relative price 
of non-cereal agricultural produce), the relationship between falling grain prices and rising measures of 
productivity not linear because very low grain prices lead to very low value addition in cereal production, and 
even losses. Given cereals’ large share of global agricultural production this depresses agricultural 
productivity measured by CEPAL. Low prices may also lead to reduction in production and higher prices in 
subsequent years as farmers switch out of cereal production and/or reduce input use in cereal production.  
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prices with those using weighted domestic producer prices from FAOSTAT. The data set constructed 
with domestic prices is less complete and shows less variability, but otherwise yields broadly similar 
similar patterns as obtained with international prices. CEPAL therefore appears to be a valid and 
useful indicator for supporting national and international target setting and monitoring, although 
further work is needed to develop and improve domestic price data. Standardisation in the 
definition of and data collection on agricultural workers may also need investigation and 
improvement – agricultural labour productivity may be underestimated in low income countries, for 
example, where rural people may be classified as agricultural workers but obtain substantial 
proportions of their incomes from non-farm activities (Haggblade et al., 2010; Reardon, 1998).  
Our earlier consideration of agricultural productivity’s role in stimulating economic growth and 
structural change also highlighted threats to agricultural labour productivity from constraints or 
costs in using fossil fuels in agriculture and from limits to further expansion of agricultural land13. It is 
therefore also appropriate to develop targets for monitoring land and energy productivity in 
agriculture. Similar indicators to CEPAL can be constructed by replacing agricultural labour by land 
and fertiliser use in the CEPAL formula. We therefore define Cereal Equivalent Land Yield (CELY) as  
CELY=
Agricultural Value Added
Agricultural land * Cereal Prices
 
 
and Cereal Equivalent Productivity of Inorganic Fertiliser (CEPIF) 14 as  
CEPIF=
Agricultural Value Added
Inorganic fertiliser  use * Cereal Prices
 
 
Figure 4 presents estimates of these two indicators by country income groups. Estimates for selected 
countries are presented in annex B.  
 
                                                          
13
 The other critical productivity challenge that requires an equivalent indicator is perhaps water productivity.  
14
 No direct measure of energy or fossil fuel use in agriculture is available. However manufacture of inorganic 
nitrogenous fertiliser is a major user of energy so fertiliser us is proposed as a proxy for energy use, using 
World Development Indicators data on inorganic fertiliser use. No estimates of the relative importance of 
fertilisers in agricultural energy demands in different regions or economies could be located, but 
examination of specific studies (Cruse et al., 2010; Hill et al., 2006; Pimentel, 2009) and the dramatic growth 
in fertiliser use in low and middle income countries suggest that fertiliser use accounts for a major  part of 
energy and fossil fuel requirements in low and middle income countries. In high income countries greater 
use of machinery means fertiliser use is likely to account for less than half but a substantial proportion of 
agriculture’s energy demands. Limiting inorganic fertiliser use can also yield environmental benefits through 
reduced nitrate pollution and nitrous oxide emissions, and could slow depletion of limited global stocks of 
phosphates.  
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Figure 4 CELY (value added tonnes grain equivalent /ha) and CEPIF (value added tonnes grain 
equivalent /tonne fertiliser) by country groups  
Source: calculated as described in text using international grain prices. Information on fertiliser use only 
available from 2002 to 2008.  
As with CEPALs, cereal equivalent land yield rises steadily in figure 4 from low to high income groups, 
and has generally risen from 1980 to 2010, , except for low income countries, with the extent of the 
rise varying between income groups, and with falls during periods of high cereal prices (in the early 
and late 90s and in 2008) and from 2004 in high income countries. A sudden drop in upper middle 
income countries’ CELY in 1992 appears to be due to an unexplained rise in middle income countries’ 
cereal areas in 1992. 
Values for Cereal Equivalent Land Yield (CELY) are heavily affected by land quality. This is not obvious 
in the income group comparisons in figure 4(a), as there is some averaging of land qualities across 
countries.  However figure A4(a) in annex A shows marked CELY differences across countries – as 
some countries are able to apply irrigation to obtain two or three crops per year in much of their 
agricultural land, while in others agriculture may be dominated by extensive low quality grazing 
lands. The value of this indicator in cross country comparisons is therefore limited. However it has 
considerable value as an indicator of changes in productivity over time within countries, and for 
regions and the world as a whole.  
Figures 3 and 4 together highlight the challenge facing agriculture in each country and across the 
world – how to get high income countries’ high labour and land productivity (shown by high CEPAL 
and CELY values in figures 3 and 4a) without high use of fertiliser which leads to low fertiliser 
productivity (CEPIF) in figure 4(b). On the other hand low income countries are unlikely to achieve 
high yields and labour productivity with their low rates of fertiliser use - with many crops grown 
without fertiliser at all, and unsustainable soil mining in some areas. Low income countries will 
therefore need higher fertiliser use and lower aggregate fertiliser productivity to raise their yields – 
though there is scope for improving productivity of existing fertiliser use. Major challenges are faced 
by lower and upper middle income countries as these countries are responsible for the majority of 
the world’s fertiliser use but have low fertiliser productivity. Figure 5 demonstrates these challenges, 
comparing 2008 global and high income (OECD) countries’ CEPAL, CELY15 and CEPIF with illustrative 
                                                          
15
 CELY is measured per 50ha to provide a comparable scale with CEPAL and CEPIF. 
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sustainable targets for these variables16. Although the precise targets can be debated, figure 5 
illustrates well the challenge facing world agriculture – how to dramatically raise both agricultural 
labour and external input productivity while maintaining land productivity when low external input 
productivity has been the basis for past achievement of high labour productivity in high income 
countries’ agriculture. Most discussions of the challenges facing world agriculture focus on the need 
to maintain yields with lower external input use (that is with much higher external input 
productivity) but pay scant specific attention to the critical challenge of raising agricultural labour 
productivity (for example (Foley et al., 2011; Foresight, 2011; Godfray et al., 2010b; IAASTD, 2009; 
Naylor, 2011; Pretty et al., 2011)17.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5 Illustrative sustainable agricultural productivity targets 
 
5. An indicator of real food prices relative to real incomes 
Having considered possible indicators for national and international setting and monitoring of 
agricultural development targets, we now consider possible indicators for monitoring food prices. 
Indicators should comply with the principles for ‘useful’ indicators set out at the beginning of the 
previous section (they should be relevant, based on sound theory, intuitively meaningful, 
consistently applicable across time and countries, and use (potentially) available data). In addition 
they should attempt to address the major shortcoming of current widespread use of ‘real prices’ 
relative to retail or manufacturing price indices: their failure to represent the ‘income effect’ of high 
prices on poor consumers.  
The core impact of the ‘income effect’ of food price increases is a reduction in consumers’ incomes 
available for purchase of non-food goods and services. This is particularly serious for poor people 
given the limited opportunities they have to substitute cheaper for more expensive foods (since they 
are already buying cheaper foods) and the large share of their income and expenditure that are 
                                                          
16
 We use a CELY target of 200% of the global 2008 value ((Foley et al., 2011)) with the CEPIF target twice the 
global 2008 value ((Foley et al., 2011) suggest that agriculture’s greenhouse gas emissions need to be reduced 
by roughly 75%, but current emissions are also caused by tropical deforestation and methane emissions from 
livestock and rice cultivation). The (somewhat arbitrary) CEPAL target is 50% of the high income (OECD) 2008 
CEPAL (ten times the 2008 global value).  
17
 The only explicit mention in any of these publications of the need for increases in labour productivity was in 
(Foresight, 2011) p156 where it was included in a list of potential indicators in a ‘food system dashboard’.  
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typically taken by food expenditures. We therefore propose an indicator, the Food Expenditure Ratio 
(or FER), which is defined as the expenditure required to meet essential calorific requirements 
divided by resources available for non-staple food after consumption of essential calorific 
requirements or  
FER=
Essential calorific expenditure
Total per capita consumption  - Essential calorific expenditure 
		
The FER varies with per capita consumption, minimum calorific requirements, and calorie prices. We 
propose that the FER is defined for specific consumption fractiles in a population, with, for example, 
FERD1 for mean consumption of the first (lowest) consumption decile in a population and FERQ3 for 
mean consumption of the middle quintile in a population (which may approximate the median 
consumption of the population).  Information on mean incomes and consumption by decile and 
quintile is increasingly available at country level from LSMS and other surveys, and has been 
compiled by (WIDER, 2008) and (Solt, 2012).To provide a test and proof of concept, estimates of  
FERD1 and FERQ3 were developed for selected countries and selected regions of the world by first 
obtaining rough estimates of the  proportion of total consumption by the lowest decile and the mid-
quintile (as detailed in annex B). These allowed estimation of the mean per capita consumption in 
each of the two fractiles as a percentage of total household consumption, which when multiplied by 
household final consumption expenditure in current US$ and divided by population (from (World 
Bank, 2011), codes NE.CON.PRVT.CD and SP.POP.TOTL ) provided an estimate of mean per capita 
consumption in each fractile.  Essential calorific requirements were specified as 1800kcal per person 
per day (in line with FAO standards), and expenditure on grain required to obtain this estimated  
using a standard 3500kcal/kg grain( Shapouri et al. (2009)), and international grain prices (in current 
US$) estimated with prices and grain index weights taken from (World Bank, 2012).  
Figure 6 shows estimated FERD1 and FERQ3 for major regions of the world from 1990, while annex C 
shows estimated FERD1 and FERQ3 for selected countries in Asia, Latin America and Africa.  
In broad terms, the patterns in the figures suggest that the indicator represents well the different 
impacts of food price increases on different households. In all figures, for example, the FERD1 values 
are substantially higher than FERQ3 values and more sensitive to food price shocks (as in the mid 
1990s and 2007/8). However these differences are less marked in more wealthy economies and in 
those that have become more wealthy over time, but remain marked in Africa. This is consistent first 
with the lack of income and agricultural growth in Africa in the 90s (coupled with high gini 
coefficients as compared with Asia and even Latin America - (Dikhanov, 2005)) and with Headey’s 
observations and argument that the food crisis impacts have been substantially mitigated by 
economic growth in India and China.  A strength of the FER indicator is the way that it takes into 
account the extent and distribution of economic growth within economies.  
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Figure 6 Food expenditure ratios (FERs) for Decile 1 and Quintile 3 by regions 
Source: see text  
There are, however, some apparent anomalies, such as the very high values for the East Asia Pacific 
region before 1993. There are substantially more anomalies for FER estimates prior to 1990 and in 
estimates for some countries (for example Madagascar, Zambia and Cameroon had to be dropped 
from the annex). There may be a number of explanations for the more extreme values: 
• The cost of meeting calorific requirements is calculated using international grain prices. 
However there is substantial variation in the extent to which international prices are 
transmitted to domestic markets, and governments may take specific measures to reduce 
this to protect domestic consumers when international prices are high.  
• Weights accorded to different grains are determined by relative international production 
and consumption patterns, but these will vary for specific countries. 
• In poor agrarian economies with significant numbers of poor food deficit producers, a 
substantial proportion of their calorific requirements may not be purchased, reducing their 
vulnerability to price increase (although capital constraints and hungry periods may mean 
that price increases nevertheless affect them very badly) 
• When faced with serious price increases poor people do switch from more diverse diets and 
reduce their intake particularly of more nutritious food. They also borrow, draw down on 
savings  and sell assets to maintain essential food intake, as well as reduce their non-food 
expenditures.  
• The estimate used of first decile share of consumption in sub Saharan Africa may well be too 
low (see annex 2). Raising the income share lowers the graphed FERD1 for sub Saharan 
Africa across all years, but does not change Africa’s pattern of greater variability and less 
general improvement over time  
The principal ways in which the calculations and estimates presented here could be improved would 
be with: 
• use of domestic rather than international prices;  
• use of country specific weights across different grains (and staple roots and tubers) 
• improved estimates of decile and quintile incomes within and across countries; 
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• allowance for consumption of some livestock products as ‘essential’ in less poor countries 
and among less poor consumers in low income economies.    
However, as figure 5 shows in comparison with figure 1, the relatively rough and ready trial 
estimation presented here captures a number of important features about real food prices 
measured in terms of opportunity cost of non-food expenditures allowing for income effects, 
particularly for the poor ((Dorward, 2012a)). It also allows for global regional and country analysis 
concerned about food insecurity, poverty reduction and economic development and offers 
substantial advantages over current calculations of ‘real prices’ deflated by price indices.   
6. Post 2015 international indicators and goals  
The two previous sections of this paper have proposed and tested four measures of agricultural 
productivity and of food prices, measures developed to address current gaps in suites of commonly 
used measures and failings in measures that are used. We now briefly discuss these measures in the 
context of growing interest in what should follow the MDGs after they expire in 2015.  
Debate on successors to the MDGs has followed two main strands: assuming that some international 
global agreement is needed on global challenges, first what process should lead to the establishment 
of goals, and second what challenges should be addressed (what goals, targets and indicators should 
be established). The two strands are connected, in that the process should determine what 
challenges are focussed on, but they can and should also be pursued independently – all 
stakeholders, in whatever process of goal, target and indicator establishment should benefit from 
informed analysis and discussion of these issues18.  
The four measures proposed in this paper specifically address calls for a post 2015 international 
agreement to include  explicit attention to the problems of agriculture, the environment, 
sustainability, equity, jobless growth and food security; to integration and holism across and within 
sectors; to aggregate and disaggregated targets and indicators that promote accountability; and to 
changes needed as regards production and consumption within high as well as middle and low 
income economies (for example (BOND, 2011; Global Call to Action Against Poverty (GCAP) et al., 
2011; Melamed, 2012a, b; Waage et al., 2010)). In this CEPAL is specifically concerned with jobless 
growth and equity, its integration with CELY and CEPIF provides holistic  attention to the 
environment, sustainability and growth in high as well as low and middle income countries (as in 
figure 5). The FERD1 is concerned with the effects of food price changes on equity and food security. 
All the measures have been examined at both global, regional or income group and national scales 
of aggregation and disaggregation. Furthermore, they comply with principles for ‘useful’ indicators 
set out earlier. There is, however, need for substantial improvement in the coverage and reliability 
of some national and international statistics and statistical systems – for example there are widely 
recognised difficulties  with international statistics on agricultural production and areas (for example 
(Headey, 2011)), with gaps in coverage of income and expenditure surveys and domestic price 
information and, as noted earlier, in standard definitions of variables such as ‘agricultural 
employment’. Assimilation of these indicators into post 2015 goals and targets could therefore not 
only utilise existing data on these issues, but also stimulate improvements in information on them in 
                                                          
18
 Discussion will also be framed by fundamental questions regarding the purpose of a post-2015 agreement in 
a very different global context from the one that framed the MDGs ((Melamed, 2012a)).   
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the future (an important side benefit of the MDGs was improved information on some topics, 
(Waage et al., 2010)) 
  
7. Conclusions 
This paper has examined the roles of falling of food prices relative to wages in wider economic 
growth and development.  These roles have a long history in in the development economics 
literature, but their consideration seems to have been surprisingly absent from debates about the 
impacts of high food prices on development (impacts which have commonly been seen as beneficial, 
through their role in stimulating research investment). 
The ‘need’ for low food prices to stimulate wider economic growth highlights the importance of 
raising the productivity of agricultural labour in the economy, particularly in smallholder agriculture, 
which offer critical but temporary and challenging opportunities. However agricultural labour 
productivity has also been widely overlooked in recent policy and faces considerable challenges. 
These arise not only in the need for governments and the global community to recognise the public 
good characteristics of agricultural productivity and promote investment in agriculture despite 
(indeed to encourage low prices), but also because environmental challenges require a simultaneous 
fall in fossil fuel and material inputs which have historically been a major contributor to rising land 
and labour productivity. Related to this is a need for indicators that provide better measures of 
different types of agricultural productivity and of food price impacts on particularly poorer people.   
Two sets of indicators proposed in the final sections of the paper go some way to meeting this need. 
These could be widely implemented, for example supporting new international development goals 
when the current Millennium Development Goals expire in 2015. They would require limited further 
development and cost, since many of their basic elements are already found within national and 
international data systems, but they could support important improvements in these systems. 
Further challenges in agricultural policy, and in the development of related indicators, need to be 
addressed in, for example,  links between agriculture and food systems on the one hand with 
energy, water use, climate change, land institutions and access, and micro-nutrient deficiencies and 
diet related non-communicable diseases.   
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Annex A:  Country estimates of Cereal Equivalent Productivity Indicators 
Figure A1: CEPAL estimates for selected African countries using international prices (a and b) and 
domestic producer prices (c and d)  
Figure A2: CEPAL estimates for selected Asian countries using international prices (a and b) and 
domestic producer prices (c and d) 
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Figure A3: CEPAL estimates for selected Latin American countries using international prices (a and 
b) and domestic producer prices (c and d) 
 
 
Figure A4: CELY, raw and indexed estimates for selected countries  
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Figure A5: CEPIF estimates for selected countries  
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Annex B: Methods and data used in calculating Food expenditure ratios 
Estimates of Food Exopenditure Ratios were developed in three stages: 
1. Estimation of decile and quintile consumption shares 
2. Estimation of mean consumption per capita for decile 1 (D1) and quintile 3 (Q3) 
3. Estimation of minimum calorific expenditure requirements 
We describe each of these in turn.  
1. Estimation of decile and quintile consumption shares  
Owing to differences in data available on consumption distribution within countries and across 
regional and global populations, different  methods were used for country estimation and for 
regional and global estimation.  
1.1 Estimation of decile and quintile consumption shares by country 
Gini coefficients and information on decile and quintile shares were obtained from (WIDER, 2008) 
which  reports Gini coefficients and decile and quintile shares from different surveys in different 
countries and years, but does not provide complete sets of country estimates by year. To obtain a 
approximate estimates of annual decile and quintile shares, these were regressed on gini 
coefficients. A scatter plot suggested a strong correlation between Gini coefficients and decile and 
quintile shares (see figure A2.1)   
 
Figure B1: Scatter plot of decile consumption shares against Gini coefficents 
 
Decile and quintile shares were then regressed on gini coefficients. Log linear, quadratic and cubic 
functions were estimated. A slightly better fit was obtained with data on individual consumption as 
compared with income, with a cubic functional form for decile 1 income share, while a simple linear 
form gave the best fit for the quintile 3 income share. Selected equations are shown in table A2.1.  
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Table B1 Regression estimates of D1 and Q3 consumption shares on Gini coefficients 
Dependent 
variable 
D1 
consumption 
share 
Q3 
consumption 
share 
Coefficients   
 Constant 5.54 23.86 
 G  -23.05 
 G
2
 -29.76  
 G
3
 27.74  
R
2
 0.853 0.792 
N 293 130 
 
Counties were then inspected to determine how many gini coefficient estimates were contained in 
the database. For those with three or more, interpolation was used to estimate ginji coeffcients for 
missing years. These gini coefficients were then used to estimate the relevant decile and quintile 
income shares, using the  regression equations in table A2.1.   
1.2 Estimation of regional and global decile and quintile consumption shares 
There is a considerable literature and debate on estimation of global income and consumption 
distribution (for example (Dikhanov, 2005), (Palma, 2011), (Milanovic, 2006), (Sala-i-Martin, 2006), 
(Anand and Segal, 2008), (Milanovic, 2009), Palma (2011)). For illustrative purposes regional and 
global estimates of decile and quartile income shares were taken from (Dikhanov, 2005). It should be 
noted that Dikhanov’s estimate of the gini coefficient for sub Saharan Africa appears to be markedly 
higher than that of Anand and Segal.  
2. Estimation of mean consumption per capita for decile 1 (D1) and quintile 3 (Q3) 
Dividing the estimates of decile and quartile consumption shares derived as above by 0.1 and 0.2 
respectively allowed estimation of mean decile and quartile per capita consumption as a percentage 
of the mean per capita consumption for population as a whole. This was then multiplied by 
household final consumption expenditure in current US$ and divided by population (from (World 
Bank, 2011), codes NE.CON.PRVT.CD and SP.POP.TOTL ) to give estimates of mean per capita 
consumption in current US$.  
3. Estimation of minimum calorific expenditure requirements 
 Essential calorific requirements were specified as 1800kcal per person per day, in line with FAO 
standards, and expenditure required to obtain this from grain estimated  using a standard of 
3500kcal/kg grain ((Shapouri et al., 2009)), with international grain prices (in current US$) estimated 
with prices and grain index weights taken from (World Bank, 2012). 
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Annex C: Country estimates of Food expenditure ratios 
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